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The major causes of radio frequency radiation hazards are the transmitting antennas of radio, TV, radar, cell phones, 
wireless data acquisition systems and global positioning systems in the new age of communication technology using various 
modulation schemes such as amplitude modulation (AM), frequency modulation (FM) etc. The transmitting antennas of these 
communication devices generate electromagnetic fields (EMFs). Under such conditions, electric detonator wires work as 
receiving antenna and pickup sufficient energy from electromagnetic fields to initiate an accidental explosion. There have been 
several instances of accidental firing of detonators by radio frequency pickup. In this study an attempt has been made to 
minimize such explosions and to provide a basis for the assessment and simulation of the radio frequency radiation hazard 
parameters associated with industrial electric detonators. This research examines the radiated powers of various frequency 
bands to determine the safe distance from transmitting antenna. Two empirical relationships for the estimation of minimum safe 
distance (MSD) have been suggested based on mathematical simulation. Using these relations desired MSDs have been 
calculated for the relevant frequency bands. The values obtained have been compared with the experimental values available 
that demonstrated strong agreement between them. The average percentage deviations of calculated MSDs from suggested 
relations are found between 0.096% and 10.718%, with regression coefficient 0.970 ≤ R ≤ 1. This reflects the soundness of the 
proposed empirical relations. The blasting engineers, detonator designers and researchers may use these relations as a handy 
tool to prevent undesired explosions by maintaining minimum safe distance in radio frequency prone hazardous areas. 
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Introduction 
Explosive materials and explosive devices are 
inherently dangerous products. Safety of its 
manufacturers, users, environment and general public 
is the challenge for peer researchers. Several accidents 
have been investigated in which explosive blasting is 
initiated by radio frequency radiation. To avoid such 
explosions electric detonators are made in such a way 
that they are either EMF resistant or placed to operate 
outside the effective area of radio frequency hazards. 
To look into the more details of electric detonators 
the study of different phases of its historical evolution 
is required. The development of an electric method of 
explosive blasting has a long history of late 18th to 
early 19th centuries.1 Worldwide blast of a demolition 
gunpowder charge by an electrical method for the first 
time ever was implemented in 1811 by P L Schilling.2 
He developed a special charcoal fuse and power supply 
along with an insulated electrical wire for underground 
and underwater blasting operations. However, the first 
patent for ignition of the gunpowder charges by electric 
spark using mixture of fulminate and gunpowder was 
received in 1830 by Moses Show. In Russia the electric 
blasting technique was mastered for military and public 
uses in the years 1840–46. Alfred Nobel in 1864–67 
developed first commercial fulminating detonator using 
mercury. The first electrical detonator with a resistance 
bridge was developed by D M Andrievskii in 1865 
where as the first patent of electric delay detonator was 
received by American inventor G J Smith in 1895.  
In 1940, the use of penthrite as a main detonator was 
begun in the USA. This led to the strengthening of 
electrical detonator in terms of initiating impulse 
power, safety and reliability of its practical 
applications. During 1956–1980 different types of 
electrical detonators were developed. For example, in 
1956 heat resistant electrical detonators and in 1966–68 
delay electrical detonators were developed in USSR; in 
1976–77 an Australian company developed the first 
sample of an electronic detonator using capacitor as 
delay element and an electronic chip; in 1988 a 
domestic wireless microwave radio electrical detonator 
was developed.  
The subject of radiation frequency risk associated 








safety. Modern radio and radar transmitters emit 
electromagnetic radiation of high intensity that is 
harmful to ordnance, attendant workers and associated 
equipment. Premature actuation of electric detonators 
increases with the developing powerful antennas of 
communication systems. Characterization of the radio 
frequency sensitivity and other details of electrically 
initiated blasting devices are enumerated in various 
standards, manual, guides and handbooks. IEEE Std 
C95.4(3) offers an overview of electromagnetic 
radiation phenomena that may pose a possible threat 
to the transport, storage or use by industrial or 
military personnel of electrical blasting caps. In this 
standard, the horizontal dipole model has been taken 
into account for determining the standoff distances 
from transmitters. Time to time different safety 
guides4,5, standards6,7 and manuals8,9 have been 
adopted and practiced for safety against radio 
frequency radiation hazards. Galuga and Bray10 have 
studied the electromagnetic susceptibility of 
commercial electric detonators when exposed to plane 
wave radiation to access the feasibility of inducing 
sufficient current to cause its explosion. Wagh et al.11 
have focused their research on the application of 
electrical detonators for magnetic flux compression 
generator uses which require synchronization of two 
occurrences with precise time delay of tens of 
microsecond and jitter within a few microsecond. 
Apart from electric detonators now a day’s electronic 
detonators are becoming very popular due to its 
precise delay time and many other attractive technical 
features.12 The computer simulation and calculation of 
the mono-static radar cross section (RCS) of the 
electric hot-wire detonator with its casing and lead 
wires provide the biggest RCS contribution, ranging 
from –16 and –22 DBsm in the 3–10 GHz frequency 
range.13 Fousson et al.14 have developed a high safety, 
high reliability two-stage electric detonator that 
consists of only secondary high explosive. 
Electromagnetic (EM) modeling to determine the 
electromagnetic characteristics of hot-wire detonators 
in modern EM radiation is done by Lambrecht et al.15 
The following sections cover the details of radiation 
hazards along with transmitter power for different 
frequency bands. 
 
Radio Frequency Radiation Hazards 
Different modulating schemes such as AM, FM, 
frequency shift keying (FSK), phase shift keying 
(PSK) etc. and TVs, RADARs, mobile phones base 
stations are the main sources of strong EMFs. With 
the distance from the transmitting antenna, the 
strength of EM fields declines. The detonators 
exposed under the strong electromagnetic field in 
certain circumstances pickup this radiation energy and 
led to the accidental explosion of ammunitions. The 
standard method of firing an electric detonator is to 
add electrical energy to the firing line connected to 
the detonator from a blasting machine, power line or 
other sources of electrical power. The unshielded leg 
wires or circuit wires can serve as an antenna similar 
to that on a radio or TV receiver when the detonator 
wires are exposed in a strong EM fields. In the circuit 
wiring, the radio frequency (RF) field generates an 
electrical current that flows through the electrical 
detonator linked to it. In some situations, ample RF 
power may be induced in the wires to fire the 
electrical detonator, depending on the strength of the 
RF field and the antenna configuration created by the 
detonator wires and its orientation. By maintaining 
safe operating distances16 from the transmitting 
antenna accidental firing of detonators can be 
minimized. 
 
Sources of Radio Frequency Hazards 
In the era of information technology, transmitting 
antenna needs more input power for long distance 
reliable communication of data. The power fed to the 
transmitting antenna is considered as main source of 
radio frequency in the space and transmitted in the 
form of signal. The received power PR (Watt) by an 
antenna placed at a distance R (meter) from the 
transmitting antenna is given by Friis17 as 𝑃
 𝑃 𝐺 𝐺 𝑐 4𝜋𝑅𝑓⁄ , where 𝑃 , 𝐺  , 𝐺 , 𝑐, and 𝑓are, 
respectively, the power (in Watt) fed to the 
transmitting antenna, gain of transmitting antenna, 
gain of receiving antenna, speed of light (3 × 108 m/s) 
and frequency (Hz) of the transmitted signal. The 
radio frequencies of commercial AM broadcast 
transmitters (0.535 to 1.605 MHz) are theoretically 
the most dangerous.17 This is because high power and 
low frequency are combined to ensure the lead wires 
have no loss of RF energy. It is unlikely that high-
frequency FM and TV transmitters would create a 
dangerous situation, as they are generally mounted on 
top of high towers and the strength of EM wave is 
significantly reduced at ground level. The cell radio 
and other wireless products must be identified as a 
possible threat and should therefore not be put 
directly in the blasting zone. There is little risk that 
RF energy sources such as microwave relays will ever 
be a realistic problem. However all directional RF 




sources of high-gain antennas, such as fixed and 
mobile marine radar, should be taken into account to 
greatly increase the effective radiated power. In 
surrounding of high power radar installations, blasting 
should be avoided. RF antennas used in underground 
mining activities could pose a dangerous condition 
and they can only be allowed after proper assessment 
and testing as per IS/IEC 60079–0.(18,19) 
 
Mobile Telephony 
In the explosive industry, installations of cell phone 
towers and mobile handsets have raised concern about 
such personnel communication devices and 
installations operating near electrical blasting circuits. 
The average height of the mobile phone tower is 
typically 33.50 m to 36.60 m and operates with a 
maximum efficient radiated power of 500 W. In this 
case, the resulting safe distance to the blasting circuits 
should be appropriate as the vertical angle between 
the radiator and the ground is very sharp when rolling 
off the RF antenna output. Battery powered hand held 
mobile phones are low power devices and their 
specific absorption rate (SAR) is maintained below 
recommended safe levels for human tissue. It may be 
possible that portable mobile phones brought very 
close to the detonator leg wire. Therefore, mobile 
phones with output less than 1 W should be kept at 
least about 2.50 m from a blasting circuit. The battery 
charging jack of a mobile phone may also come into 
touch with a detonator’s leg wire. The consequence is 
in any event, a potentially dangerous situation.  
 
Hand held RF Sources 
Low power hand held RF sources such as keyless 
entry systems, remote control, garage door openers etc., 
poses several concerns relating to the safe use of blasting 
circuits or electro-explosive equipment in the vicinity. 
For such devices of power less than or equal to 2 W a 
safe distance of 1.50 m must be maintained.16 
 
RF Receiving Antenna 
In AM radio broadcasting and mobile operation, 
the radio frequencies are picked up by lead-wire 
layout of detonator and work as receiving antenna. 
The receiving antennas of the type dipole circuit can 
play a very sensitive role in RF pickup. The 
wavelengths of radio frequency radiations are 
approximately given by 𝜆 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑡 1000/𝑓 𝑀𝐻𝑧 . 
The loop circuit is also sensitive pickup circuit 
usually encountered in blasting operations besides the 
dipole antenna.16 The larger loop area pickups greater 
RF current and it is highest when placed parallel to 
the plane of the transmitter antenna. 
 
Military RF Installations 
The number of military RF source transmitters is 
becoming very high, covering frequencies from 
kilohertz to high power outputs of thousands of 
megahertz. Military radars can affect the particular 
type of blasting operations conducted during the 
investigation and manufacture of offshore oil and gas 
resources, the removal of fixed or mobile offshore oil 
or gas drilling rigs and manufacturing platforms, etc. 
The safe distance from an electrically initiated 
blasting operation from this sort of radar is 4830 m.16 
 
Methods of Modeling and Assessment  
The calculation of MSDs from potential hazardous 
zone of radio frequency transmitter to electric 
detonators is needed to prevent explosions that may 
take place during its operation by induced 
electromagnetic field. Attempts8,16,20  have been made 
to access the potential hazardous zones as the function 
of frequency and electric field strength. The most 
dangerous frequencies are between 2 MHz and 80 
MHz for electric field strength of 0.5 V/m.20 The safety 
distances in meter are reported16,20 as 5.5𝑓𝑃 . , 
10.95𝑃 .  and 876𝑓 𝑃 .  for frequency range 0.01
𝑓 2 𝑀𝐻𝑧, 2.0 𝑓 80.0 𝑀𝐻𝑧 and 80.0 𝑓
10 𝑀𝐻𝑧, respectively, where ‘P’ is the equivalent 
isotropic radiated power (EIRP) in Watt and ‘f’ is the 
frequency in MHz. The distance in meter between the 
antenna and the point at which the electric field is 
measured is also given by 𝐷 √30𝑃 𝐸⁄ , where ‘P’ is 
equivalent isotropic radiated power in Watt and E is the 
electric field strength in Volt/meter.  
It has been observed that in previous research works 
various attempts have been made to calculate MSDs of 
commercial electronic detonators form the radio 
frequency source based on experimental findings. 
Conducting experiments are not possible without 
expensive instruments, specialized manpower and also 
very time consuming. The distances are expressed for 
limited range of frequencies and EIRP. One can find 
very difficult to know such distances for different 
frequency ranges and EIRPs. It therefore calls for the 
creation of relationships which could be used at any 
given value of radiated power for the measurement of 
MSD. In the present work, an attempt has been made to 
express the MSD (or D) in terms of transmitted antenna 
power (P). The experimental values16 of transmitted 
power and minimum safe distance (D) are simulated and 
results are analyzed. Based on mathematical 




simulations, the following two empirical relations 
have been proposed: 
 
𝐷 𝐾 𝑃  𝐾  𝑃  𝐾  … (1) 
 
𝐷  𝐾 𝑃  … (2) 
 
where D, is MSD in meter; P, is transmitter power in 
Watt; K , K ,K , K  and K  are the constants. The 
values of constants are listed in Table 1. These relations 
give very precise and accurate calculation of MSDs for 
various transmitter powers without having experimental 
setup. Having the values of transmitter power a simple 
technician can easily calculate the MSD and prevent 
explosions that may take place without proper 
knowledge. 
The transmitted powers by various antennas 
working on different frequencies were studied and 
simulated for the calculation of MSDs. Two of them are 
shown in Figs 1 & 2. Proposed Eqs (1) & (2) are the 
mathematical representation of Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, 
respectively. This research will be very helpful to avoid 
fatal accidents caused by detonating devices and 
explosives. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Using proposed Eqs (1) & (2), the values of MSDs of 
different transmitters’ power have been calculated and 
listed in Tables 3–5 along with the available 
experimental values. The calculated  values are in  good 




Min. distance (m) 
(experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
 ׀ Deviation % ׀
1,000 219.456 223.69 1.929316 
2,000 219.456 233.66 6.472368 
3,000 219.456 243.61 11.00631 
4,000 219.456 253.54 15.53113 
5,000 243.840 263.45 8.042159 
10,000 344.424 312.7 9.21074 
25,000 545.592 457.45 16.1553 
50,000 762.000 688.7 9.619423 
100,000 1097.280 1113.7 1.496428 
500,000 2438.400 2713.7 11.29019 
Average % deviation = 9.075336 
 
Table 3––Transmitters up to 50 MHz (Excluding AM Broadcast) 
Transmitter 
power (W) 
Min. distance (m) 
(experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
 ׀ Deviation %׀
100 240.792 241.2 0.169441 
200 341.376 341.1083112 0.078415 
500 539.496 539.3395962 0.028991 
1,000 762 762.7413716 0.097293 
1,500 935.736 934.1635831 0.168041 
5,000 1703.832 1705.541556 0.100336 
50,000 5394.96 5393.395962 0.028991 
500,000 17038.32 17055.41556 0.100336 








Fig. 2 — HF Amateur transmitters (28.0–29.7 MHz) 
 
Table 1––Numerical values of constants for different radio frequency transmitters 
S. Nos.  Transmitter types 𝐾  𝐾  𝐾  𝐾  𝐾  
1. AM broadcast (0.535 to 1.705 MHz) 1.0 10  0.010 213.7 –– –– 
2. Up to 50MHz (Excluding AM Broadcast) –– –– –– 24.12 0.5 
3. Medium Frequency (1.7 to 3.4 MHz)  7.0 10  0.113 22.30 –– –– 
4. High Frequency (28 to 29.7 MHz)  –– –– –– 14.30 0.499 
5. VHF (35 to36 MHz) Public, (42 to 44 MHz) Public use,  
(50 to 54 MHz)  
–– –– –– 11.20 0.499 
6. VHF (144-148 MHz) Amateur, (150.8-161.6 MHz) –– –– –– 3.669 0.499 
7. UHF (450- 470 MHz) Public Use Mobile phones Above  
800 MHz 
–– –– –– 2.435 0.495 
8. Channel 2 to 6 –– –– –– 68.60 0.216 
9. FM Radio –– –– –– 55.70 0.216 
10. Channel 7 to 13 –– –– –– 41.97 0.216 





good agreement with the available experimental values. 
We have also calculated the average percentage 
deviation of MSDs obtained from proposed Eqs (1) and 
(2) using the relation, Percentage deviation = 
[|Experimental value − Calculated Value|/ Experimental 
value] × 100. In the case of Eq. (1), the average 
percentage deviation (APD) has been estimated as 
9.07% and 69.93% for AM broadcast transmitters 
(0.535–1.705 MHz) and medium frequencies (1.7–3.4 
MHz), respectively. However, in the case of Eq. (2) the 
average percentage deviations have been estimated to be 
0.09%, 0.22%, 0.14%, 0.28%, 0.48%, 10.71%, 10.53% 
and 10.59%, respectively, for the transmitters up to 50 
MHz (excluding AM broadcast), high frequency (28 to 
29.7 MHz) amateur, VHF (35 to 36 MHz) public (42 to 
44 MHz) public use - (50 to 54 MHz), VHF (144–148 
Table 4 –– Recommended distance of mobile transmitters and 
cellular telephones—(Contd.) 
 




Min. distance (m) 
(experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
 ׀ Deviation %׀ 
1 3.658 3.669 0.300710771 
5 8.23 8.190939986 0.474605274 
10 11.582 11.57571196 0.054291459 
50 25.908 25.84245353 0.252997046 
100 36.576 36.52142476 0.149210513 
180 49.073 48.96984076 0.210215878 
200 51.816 51.6133062 0.39117995 
250 57.912 57.69255544 0.378927611 
500 81.686 81.53306035 0.187228715 
600 89.611 89.29871011 0.348495039 
1,000 115.519 115.225264 0.254275073 
1,500 141.427 141.0643428 0.2564271 
10,000 365.15 363.5362406 0.441944247 
Average % deviation = 0.284654514 
 




Min. distance (m) 
Experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
 ׀ Deviation %׀ 
1 2.438 2.435 0.123051682 
5 5.486 5.401185806 1.546011554 
10 7.62 7.612003259 0.104944108 
50 16.764 16.88453551 0.719013997 
100 23.774 23.79572633 0.091386936 
180 31.6992 31.83162835 0.417765593 
200 33.528 33.535811 0.023296949 
250 37.49 37.45236695 0.100381571 
500 53.035 52.78239807 0.476292881 
600 57.912 57.76753478 0.249456451 
1,000 74.676 74.38732911 0.386564483 
1,500 91.44 90.92098641 0.567600163 
10,000 236.22 232.5406947 1.557575694 
Average % deviation = 0.489487851 
 
Table 4 –– Recommended distance of mobile transmitters and 
cellular telephones 
Medium Frequency (1.7 to 3.4 MHz) Fixed, Mobile and Maritime 
Transmitter 
power (W) 
Min. distance (m) 
(experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
% Deviation ׀ 
1 4.572 22.412993 390.222944 
5 10.058 22.864825 127.3297375 
10 14.021 23.4293 67.10149062 
50 31.09 27.9325 10.15599871 
100 43.891 33.53 23.60620628 
180 58.826 42.4132 27.90058818 
200 62.179 44.62 28.23943775 
250 69.494 50.1125 27.88945808 
500 28.146 77.05 173.7511547 
600 107.594 87.58 18.601409 
1,000 138.684 128.3 7.487525598 
1,500 169.774 176.05 3.696679115 
Average % deviation = 69.93663984 
 




Min. distance (m) 
(experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical)) 
 ׀ Deviation %׀
1 14.326 14.3 0.181488203 
5 32.004 31.92435045 0.248873736 
10 45.11 45.11656611 0.014555784 
50 100.889 100.7214733 0.166050544 
100 142.646 142.3429747 0.212431697 
180 191.11 190.860922 0.130332258 
200 201.473 201.1638808 0.153429596 
250 225.247 224.8578748 0.172754865 
500 318.516 317.7767138 0.232103308 
600 348.996 348.0434872 0.272929429 
1,000 450.494 449.0927432 0.311048932 
1,500 551.668 549.8010637 0.338416639 
10,000 1424.33 1416.889681 0.522373242 
Average % deviation = 0.227445249 
 
VHF (35 to36 MHz) Public, (42 to 44 MHz) Public use,  




Min. distance (m) 
Experimental16) 
Min. distance (m) 
(theoretical) 
 ׀ Deviation %׀ 
1 11.278 11.22 0.514275581 
5 24.994 25.04833651 0.217398202 
10 35.357 35.39915187 0.119217904 
50 78.943 79.02761749 0.10718808 
100 111.557 111.6844878 0.114280437 
180 149.657 149.7524157 0.063756283 
200 157.886 157.8362757 0.031493801 
250 176.479 176.426948 0.029494751 
500 249.326 249.3324985 0.002606444 
600 273.406 273.0802746 0.119136163 
1,000 352.654 352.3650755 0.081928618 
1,500 431.902 431.3823731 0.120311308 
10,000 1115.263 1111.713442 0.318270922 
Average % deviation = 0.141489115 




MHz) amateur- (150.8–161.6 MHz), UHF (450–470 
MHz) public use mobile phones above 800 MHz, 
channel 2 to 6, FM radio and channel 7 to 13. In most of 
the cases the average percentage deviations are around 
10% or below, which show that the calculated values are 
very close to the experimental values. The regression 
coefficient (R) of proposed relations is 1 in most of the 
cases. The values of R and APD give us guarantee for 
the precise and accurate calculation of MSD using 
proposed relations. The key benefit of the current 
models is the simplicity of the formulas, which require 
no experimental data other than radio frequency 
transmitter power. 
The proposed equations may be used to draw 
boundary lines separating safe and unsafe regions. For 
each band considered in this research a separate 
logarithmic curve can be plotted. These curves can be 
used for estimating MSDs to ensure safe use of 
commercial electric detonators. However, in case of a 
particular radiated power for which safe distance is 
lying between two minor gridlines, the determination 
of exact distance is very difficult. To avoid such critical 
situations the proposed equations are developed. These 
equations give the exact value of MSD. 
 
Conclusions 
The primary necessity for the operation of the 
explosive industry is the protection of workers, 
customers, the public and the environment in the 
manufacture, transport, storage, handling and use of 
explosive materials. Electric detonators play a very 
important role in the safe use of explosives. In the age 
of communication technology, high power radio 
frequency transmitters induce an undesired electric 
current in electric detonators that may results in 
disastrous explosion. Prevention of such explosions is 
the need of the hour and it can be achieved by 
assessment of hazards associated with the electric 
detonators operating under the influence of radio 
frequency radiators. This research aims to contribute 
in the reduction of explosions caused by induced 
electromagnetic current in USA make commercial 
electric detonators. The proposed relations have been 
used for the calculation of MSDs from the radio 
frequency radiation sources. 
Their APDs lie between 0.096% and 10.71% and 
having regression coefficient 0.970 ≤ R ≤ 1. This 
gives us enough confidence that the calculated values 
of MSDs are very precise and accurate. Therefore, 
proposed relations can be used as an alternative tool 
in place of big bank of experimental data given in 
different safety guide lines. It can contribute to the 
significant reduction of fatal accidents caused by pick 
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Table 5––Transmitter power and minimum safe distance for 
VHF TV and FM broadcasting 








 ׀ Deviation %׀
100 249.936 185.4915438 25.78438 
500 249.936 262.6041812 5.06857 
1,000 249.936 305.0170495 22.03806 
10,000 441.96 501.5614113 13.4857 
100,000 786.384 824.7534021 4.87922 
316,000 1051.56 1057.441926 0.559352 
1,000,000 1402.08 1356.201173 3.272198 
10,000,000 2496.312 2230.09886 10.66426 










 ׀ Deviation %׀ 
100 203.302 150.6104809 25.91786 
500 203.302 213.2223454 4.87961 
1,000 203.302 247.659616 21.81858 
10,000 362.712 407.2444695 12.27764 
100,000 644.652 669.6612901 3.879502 
316,000 859.536 858.5935172 0.10965 
1,000,000 1149.096 1101.17209 4.170575 
10,000,000 2039.112 1810.736246 11.19977 
Average % deviation = 10.53165 
 








 ׀ Deviation %׀ 
100 153.01 113.4851325 25.83156 
500 153.01 160.6632286 5.001783 
1,000 153.01 186.611743 21.96049 
10,000 271.882 306.8590733 12.8648 
100,000 483.108 504.5903832 4.446704 
316,000 649.224 646.9509859 0.350112 
1,000,000 859.536 829.734158 3.467201 
10,000,000 1530.096 1364.391387 10.82969 
Average % deviation = 10.59404 
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